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Abstract 
 
The creation of Intreo as a one-stop shop for jobseekers in Ireland occurred 
during the financial and sovereign debt crisis period of 2010–16. The 
organisational merger was the product of an extensive programme of 
successful administrative reorganisation and service integration that deserves 
attention. This article begins with an overview of the policy to merge 
insurance-based unemployment benefit, discretionary social welfare payments 
and labour market activation measures, as well as the various political and 
institutional rationales that led to this development. Drawing on the special 
issue framework concerning how the interaction of ideology, institutions and 
interests comes into play during policy change, we consider the contextual 
factors that facilitated the rapid implementation of the programme and its 
overall successful execution. Whilst focusing on the success, we also critically 
point out the inhibitors in the implementation chain, some of which predated 
the crisis, as well as problems during the implementation process, such as 
delays in the national rollout and back-office supports. We identify the main 
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contributing factors for successful implementation of a one-stop shop for 
activation and unemployment services as (a) a high problem pressure, (b) a 
small and agile implementation team, (c) changing labour relations (e.g. 
binding arbitration, weakened unions) and (d) a modern communication 
strategy.  
 
Keywords: Unemployment insurance, active labour market policies, Ireland, 
crisis, organisation merger, union, implementation 
 
Introduction 
The creation of Intreo, a network of one-stop shops (OSSs) for 
jobseekers in Ireland, occurred during a period of significant state 
retrenchment when resources were in short supply but demand for 
welfare and employment services were high. As such, the 
implementation process and outcome may be considered as one of the 
more successful policy initiatives in Irish government of recent years. 
To better understand the process of Intreo’s creation, and the 
successes and inhibitors in that process, it is necessary to set Irish 
welfare policy in context with a view to establishing how the 
constellation of ideology, interests and ideas interacted to deliver on 
what was a long-standing policy objective of several governments.  
Within the study of welfare policy, the concept of labour activation 
has attracted a wide variety of meanings (see Weishaupt, 2011), and 
became mainstream within the European policy discussion in the late 
1990s. Lødemel & Moreira (2014, p. 9) provide a broad definition of 
activation policy as ‘designing benefit rules and employment or 
training services with a view to moving unemployment income benefit 
recipients into work, and involving a wide range of interventions 
including fiscal policy, public services and education or training’.  
The Global Financial Crisis and subsequent Great Recession led to 
sharp increases in unemployment that pushed welfare policies and 
labour activation strategies centre stage for governments (Martin, 
2015). The role and arrangement of pre-existing welfare ‘regimes’ 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990) also came under closer scrutiny as 
governments sought to meet increased demands for such services with 
diminishing resources. In the two decades prior to the crisis, most 
industrial countries had moved from passive support of the 
unemployed through transfers and income maintenance, towards 
activation measures that facilitated re-entry to the labour market. At 
the onset of the crisis Ireland was a laggard in activation measures. 
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Despite reform ideas in this policy field being mooted for some time 
(Department of Social Welfare, 1986), by the mid 2000s there was 
already a salient knowledge (partly arising from EU benchmarking 
and partly through numerous national policy reports) that Ireland 
lacked effective integration of labour market policies and activation 
measures. 
As the current experience in the UK with the introduction of the 
Universal Credit system demonstrates, reform of social welfare 
systems and employment-related benefits can be deeply problematic 
in implementation terms and politically controversial, and can take far 
longer than expected to realise. That the Irish systems of welfare 
benefits for jobseekers and labour activation measures were 
integrated and made more active in a relatively short period through a 
new organisational form, and during a time of rapidly increased 
demand and in the context of rapidly shrinking public finances, must 
be regarded as a major policy success that deserves closer scrutiny. It 
required a major reconfiguration of a large department whilst 
successfully ensuring millions of welfare transfers and changes to 
eligibility and benefit duration at a time of economic decline. In the 
words of one formal senior official in that department, ‘apart from 
actually just responding to an increase in business, we’ve actually 
changed the business we do’ (Interview, 9 September 2015). In this 
paper we begin by setting out the context to the reform of the Irish 
labour activation system, before looking at the process of creating a 
new OSS system for jobseekers during the crisis. A final section 
considers the success factors that contributed to the reform, as well as 
some inhibiting factors that did not jeopardise overall progress. 
The analysis is based on two separate qualitative data sets, obtained 
independently from each other. We gained access to internal 
government documents concerning the reform process. This includes, 
for instance, agendas, minutes and progress reports. In addition, 
qualitative interviews with politicians, ministers and civil servants were 
conducted between 2015 and 2016. This paper focuses on the civil 
servants involved in the implementation process, while the interviews 
with politicians and ministers serve as a contextual background. All 
interview transcripts were scrutinised through content analysis to 
identify key reform stages.  
A recent report by the Economic & Social Research Institute also 
evaluated the direct outcomes of the Intreo introduction (Kelly et al., 
2019). It found that the OSS model did not decrease the chance of 
claiming unemployment benefits (exiting the live register) after six to 
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twelve months. Yet there are indications that the introduction a 
unified claimant process has reduced false claims. Conceptually and 
methodologically, this evaluation of effectiveness has major 
limitations, one being to assess the success relatively early after 
implementation, and remains rather inconclusive at this stage. In 
contrast to the impact evaluation on jobseekers, we are concerned 
with the success of the implementation. At the same time we are not 
conducting a process evaluation – it is merely an analysis of the 
ideology, institutions and interests that facilitated success or failure of 
the implementation. 
 
Context 
Hardiman (2012) argues that the Irish state has traditionally placed 
considerable emphasis on market conformity, enhancing competitive -
ness and keeping the state ‘out of the way’ of private (and particularly 
international) enterprise. Consequently, one would expect weak 
labour market regulation, a lack of costly active labour market policies 
(ALMPs) and low benefits (Muffels & Luijkx, 2008). Muffels & Luijkx 
(2008) show how pre-crisis Ireland fits that theoretical expectation for 
a liberal welfare state. Others have claimed that Ireland is an outlier 
in activation policies (Murphy, 2016, p. 2), but in fact the UK was the 
unusual case for a liberal welfare state. The UK implemented several 
ALMPs under New Labour, while maintaining weak regulation and 
low benefits. And the UK model of activation also differs strongly to 
the Scandinavian model, with a much stronger emphasis on sanctions, 
whereas Denmark and Sweden focus on providing costly services such 
as training and job placements. Martin (2015, p. 9) suggests that 
although basic principles of labour activation were supported 
politically in Ireland, they were not implemented due to the 
complacency which arose during the pre-crisis period of essentially full 
employment. Overall, we argue, contrary to Murphy (2016), that the 
pre-crisis Irish labour market fits well in the liberal welfare regime 
typology with little emphasis on ALMPs, low benefits, inflexibility 
(Muffels & Wilthagen, 2013) and weak regulation. 
O’Connell (2017, p. 240) points out that Ireland entered the Great 
Recession with a passive approach to labour activation, a wide number 
of relatively ineffective ALMPs and weak conditionality over extended 
periods of unemployment. There was also institutional separation 
between the department responsible for unemployment-related 
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welfare benefits and the National Training and Employment 
Authority, FÁS (Foras Áiseanna Saothair). And despite strong 
evidence of its success in other EU states, the OSS model of providing 
benefit payments, advice, and education or job placements for 
jobseekers had not gained traction in Ireland. Importantly, the issue 
was not one of particular ideological contestation, and while 
traditional left–right confrontation is not apparent across a range of 
policy domains in Ireland, the issue of labour activation might 
reasonably be expected as one where ideological concerns halted 
reform progress. 
The onset of the economic crisis from early 2008 had a two-fold 
effect on the process of service integration. First, the demand for 
services began to rapidly increase as unemployment levels increased 
(Figure 1). With the onset of the financial crisis the unemployment 
rate tripled from about 5 per cent to more than 16 per cent in the third 
quarter of 2011, and was only limited by emigration over the same 
period. Long-term unemployment, involving those continuously 
unemployed for two years or longer, increased from less than 1 per 
cent of the labour force in 2007 to 6.4 per cent in early 2012. 
 
Figure 1: Quarterly unemployment rate in Ireland, 2007  
Q1 to 2018 Q3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Unemployment rate is percentage of active population, 15–64 years. 
Source: Generated using Eurostat (lfsq_ugan and lfsq_agan).  
Merging unemployment benefit and labour market activation measures 141
16.2 
6.4 
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
10 
12 
14 
16 
18 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
P
er
ce
nt
 
total long-term (+2 years) 
07 Köppe et al article.qxp_Admin 67-2  20/05/2019  14:50  Page 141
Those who now found themselves unemployed relied heavily on 
welfare payments and other benefits in the absence of viable 
employment opportunities. Moreover, the socio-demographic profile 
of jobseekers had changed dramatically. While during the Celtic tiger 
years jobseekers had few skills and little labour market experience, 
these new crisis clients were better educated, had long careers and 
demanded a much more supportive service environment. In sum, the 
unemployment crisis and the more demanding client profile created a 
high problem pressure for institutional change. 
Second, the government agency responsible for coordinating and 
delivering activation programmes and courses (FÁS) went through an 
expenses scandal in November 2008 and the director had to resign 
subsequently. Although most of the dust had settled by late 2009, the 
organisation was in a weak position. Radha & Camasso (2013) suggest 
that, in an age of outrage, an immediate half-hearted policy response 
would follow, but on a more cosmetic level than radical and integrated 
policy reform. In other words, when the major policy reform was 
announced in spring 2010, a FÁS merger was not included in the 
proposal. Still, the low staff morale within the organisation and close 
association with the scandal made it politically opportune to include 
the FÁS merger in the later development of the service integration.  
Third, as MacCarthaigh (2018) argues, the economic crisis 
produced what Kingdon (2011) referred to as a ‘window of 
opportunity’ for introducing a range of public sector reforms that were 
otherwise unlikely to have occurred during this time. There was a long-
standing problem of integrating welfare and activation measures, 
there were solutions on offer to address this, and the crisis provided 
the window for political and administrative actors to act on these 
solutions. The shift from passive to active engagement on 
unemployment was one of the most significant policy shifts to occur 
during the crisis, and stands in sharp contrast to other policy arenas 
such as housing and health, where little paradigmatic institutional 
reforms occurred and problems accumulated in light of the budget 
cuts.  
 
Welfare and labour activation in Ireland prior to the crisis  
The ambition to integrate labour activation measures into the social 
welfare regime (as per the standard European practice), and bringing 
policy and service delivery closer together, was a long-standing one in 
Ireland. The fact that some of the welfare services for jobseekers were 
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administered through the health portfolio had given rise during the 
1980s to discussions about divesting the health services of this 
responsibility. Despite a discussion to shift service provision to the 
Department of Social Protection (DSP), this early reform agenda did 
not emphasise service integration and did not result in any meaningful 
policy change.  
Figure 2 gives an overview about the idea formation and 
implementation of major reform proposals around unemployment 
benefits, activation measures and public service renewal since 2006. 
The light grey areas indicate when the policy ideas were proposed and 
darker grey areas indicate the actual implementation, including the 
duration of the implementation process from the first policy reform to 
full nationwide delivery of the reform agenda. The more recent reform 
ideas circulated in the early 2000s and cumulated in a report by the 
then Department of Health and Children, published in 2006, which 
was concerned about moving activities not regarded as ‘core’ to the 
health services to other government departments and budgets. The 
report established the idea of moving social welfare allowances – 
which were the ‘income support of last resort’ to a wider constituency 
than just jobseekers – from the then health boards (later consolidated 
as the Health Service Executive (HSE)) to the Department of Social 
Welfare (Department of Health and Children, 2006).  
 
Figure 2: Timeline of ideas and implementation, 2006–17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Light grey: idea formation; dark grey: set-up/implementation; checked: 
ongoing refinement/adaptation post set-up phase. 
Source: Adapted from Köppe & O’Connell (2017). 
 
Following the HSE report, in the same year the government decided 
to move the Community Welfare Service (CWS), which had a 
discretionary element, to the DSP. In 2007 preparations were set in 
train to prepare for the transfer, which would include negotiations 
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with relevant public services unions over changing staff employment 
terms and conditions. In practice, these negotiations were complex 
and protracted, and by the time of the crisis little actual change had 
occurred (Köppe & O’Connell, 2017).  
An OECD review of Irish activation policies, which was published 
in the immediate aftermath of the crisis, noted the ongoing 
organisational fragmentation of the employment placement support 
system. In contrast to the HSE report, the OECD review focused on 
the integration of unemployment benefit administration and 
activation measures, while neglecting the administrative fragmenta -
tion of discretionary payments. It suggested that the following features 
characterised Irish employment services: 
 
• with a few exceptions, a separation of the benefit administration 
function from the employment service function (which placed 
Ireland amongst a minority of OECD countries); 
• a range of actors providing employment services; 
• an ‘overriding focus on training and upskilling of the labour force, 
employed and unemployed’. (Grubb et al., 2009, p. 29) 
 
The report noted that implementation by the Department of Social 
Welfare and its successor, the Department of Social and Family 
Affairs, of reforms ‘that were announced some years earlier has been 
slow’ and that ‘to allow more effective policy-making in this area the 
government needs to gain better control of its own administration’ 
(Grubb et al., 2009, p. 93). 
The organisational fragmentation was not just at national level but 
also between levels of government. The main employment service was 
the state agency FÁS (which had been established during the previous 
era of mass unemployment in the 1980s), under the supervision of the 
Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment. However, 
employment counselling supports were also provided by a separate 
Local Employment Service, facilitators within the Department of 
Social and Family Affairs, and ‘Services to the Unemployed’ activity 
within the Local Development Social Inclusion Programme, managed 
by another state agency called Pobal (Grubb et al., 2009, p. 5). The 
object of reform was therefore to consolidate jobseekers’ supports and 
activation measures into a single dedicated organisation.  
Concurrent media discourse on the Intreo reforms also reveals 
some interesting patterns to understand perceptions of success and 
failure. Figure 3 shows all articles published in Irish newspapers that 
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mention Intreo and also mention either failure or success. Overall, 
there are twice as many articles that use success in the context of 
Intreo than those that use failure. In addition, the trend over time also 
shows that the success discourse dominates from 2014 onwards, about 
two years after the unemployment rate peaked. In other words, in the 
public perception a failure discourse reversed into a discourse of 
success.  
 
Figure 3: Intreo discourse in Irish newspapers, 2012–18 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Search terms (Intreo AND (fail* OR success*)), all Irish newspapers. 
Source: Generated using LexisNexis. 
 
Notwithstanding the changing public discourse, reformers faced 
several challenges that could have potentially hindered a successful 
reform (see also Köppe & O’Connell, 2017): 
 
• Firstly, due to the sovereign debt crisis all changes had to be 
implemented with virtually no budget to facilitate these changes. 
Any major investments had to be found from existing strategic 
service development and there were limited resources for an 
implementation team, considering the scale of the reform 
proposals. In hindsight, however, the budget constraints also 
facilitated some successful changes (below). 
• Secondly, trade union resistance to reassigning personnel to 
different pay scales and contracts within the civil service had to be 
overcome. In Ireland only the core civil servants in government 
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departments are members of the civil service. All other state 
authorities belong to the public sector with different recruiting 
routes, contractual arrangements, pay scales, occupational pensions 
and trade union affiliations.  
• Thirdly, the reform team faced complex negotiations with 
numerous actors. Due to the fragmentation of the service provision, 
three government departments, at least four unions and two semi-
independent authorities (HSE, FÁS) were involved.  
 
Accounting for success: Ideas, institutions and interests 
After the formal announcement in spring 2010, and the new 
government reconfirming and prioritising the plan for service 
integration in spring 2011, the first implementation phase was 
achieved in autumn 2012 with the formal opening of Intreo – the new 
national service for jobseekers delivered via a network of OSSs across 
the state. The process itself was facilitated by the interplay between a 
variety of ideas, institutions and interests that, as Kingdon (2011) 
argues, determines whether a policy successfully emerges from the 
policy process. Its success – whether it achieves what it aims to – is also 
a result of the interplay of these factors (see FitzGerald et al. in this 
issue). We suggest that a number of contextual factors played a role in 
the successful introduction of Intreo: the preparatory work that had 
been invested in anticipation of the merger of organisations and 
services (ideas); wider administrative reorganisation and changes to 
the general IR environment (institutions); and the presence of a loan 
programme agreement (interests) with the ‘troika’ of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), European Commission and European Central 
Bank.  
 
Advance preparation: Acting on the idea 
As noted above, the idea of integrating welfare provisions for 
jobseekers with activation measures had been mooted over two 
decades earlier. The actual decision to proceed with this policy was 
taken prior to the crisis in 2006, although the main reason for the 
reform was to divest non-health-related policy responsibility from the 
HSE, instead of integrating services for jobseekers. This meant that 
preparatory work in respect of personnel and logistics was fortuitously 
quite advanced when the crisis hit. The government had made a 
decision to move the CWS function from the HSE to the DSP in 2006, 
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and preparatory work began in 2007. However, it took until 2011 for 
negotiations to conclude, with unions representing CWS staff on their 
transfer, and arguably their conclusion was accelerated by changes in 
the political and economic environment (below). 
In the 2006 decision the idea was not to establish a new 
organisation, but rather allow the HSE to focus on its core work and 
simply expand the capacity of the DSP. The decision to move towards 
an OSS system came later, but the transfer of staff was an important 
facilitating component. Köppe & O’Connell (2017, p. 11) refer to this 
reform journey as a shift from asynchronous integration (where there 
would be organisational integration but policy would remain 
fragmented) towards a parallel integration (of organisations and 
policy), to eventually a full merger in respect of both organisations and 
policy. The fact that much of the planning for the merger had already 
taken place prior to the change of government in 2011 was important 
in facilitating the subsequent developments. Once the idea for 
creating the OSS had become government policy, a period of 
institutional change alongside the management of various interests 
took hold that was to determine the pace of implementation.  
 
Administrative reorganisation: Institutional modernisation 
The creation of Intreo occurred in the wider context of a general 
programme of public sector reform and organisational rationalisation 
that began in the immediate aftermath of the crisis. As the crisis took 
hold in 2008, the government announced a series of state agency or 
‘quango’ closures and mergers in a bid to reduce costs and simplify the 
state’s administrative apparatus (MacCarthaigh, 2014). This had 
limited impact but the government that came to office accelerated and 
expanded on this administrative reorganisation at national and local 
levels (MacCarthaigh, 2017). This post-2011 reorganisation agenda 
also included the consolidation of procurement across the public 
service into a single entity and greater use of shared services models 
for back-office support functions such as payroll and pensions. It was 
in this environment that the reorganisation of functions which led to 
the creation of Intreo took place.  
 
Shifting industrial relations 
Notwithstanding a series of pay and pension cuts post 2008, as well  
as voluntary exit schemes, the government agreed a comprehensive 
pay agreement with public service unions in 2010. As identified  
by MacCarthaigh (2017), at its heart the Public Service Agreement 
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2010–14 (informally referred to as the Croke Park Agreement after 
the location of its signing) sought to reconcile trade union concerns 
over compulsory redundancies with the government’s need to further 
reduce the public service payroll bill. In return for a guarantee of no 
forced redundancies or further public service pay cuts during the 
lifetime of the agreement, trade unions agreed to implement 
significant cost-saving reform measures, and to adhere to ‘flexible’ 
redeployment arrangements and industrial peace. 
The agreement acted as an enabler for reforms that involved 
personnel moving between public service organisations and removed 
the possibility of industrial action. These changes removed major 
impediments to reform, as the 2009 OECD review of Irish activation 
policy had noted how the two unions1 representing the majority of 
community welfare officers in mid 2006 had expressed their strong 
opposition to a proposed transfer to the Department of Social and 
Family Affairs. In total four different unions were affected by the 
Intreo process, some of whom lost members due to changes in 
employment arrangements of their members, and others gained 
members by virtue of these changes (Köppe & O’Connell, 2017, p. 32). 
But in the absence of the changed environment provided by the troika, 
which quickly became the dominant interest, their acquiescence would 
have been less certain. 
 
The troika loan programme: International pressure, but Irish interests 
matter 
Irish tax revenues fell by 22 per cent between 2008 and 2010 but, 
notwithstanding the savings envisaged in the Croke Park Agreement, 
the economy continued to experience negative growth as 2011 loomed 
and the measures under the agreement looked increasingly unlikely to 
deliver sufficient savings. When the cost to the Irish Government of 
borrowing money on bond markets grew to prohibitive rates, arising 
from wider eurozone issues, the government reluctantly agreed to an 
external ‘bailout loan’ in December 2010 of some €67 billion provided 
by the troika. The support and conditionality framework in the 
memorandum of understanding (MOU) required a schedule of 
reform of the benefits system to create greater incentives to take up 
employment and to tighten eligibility and means-test criteria 
(Hardiman & Regan, 2012, p. 12).  
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In the MOU, a series of reforms were envisaged across three main 
domains:  
 
i. further fiscal consolidation, including new taxes; 
ii. financial sector reforms, including recapitalisation of the Irish 
banks; 
iii. structural reforms, including more social welfare activation 
measures, reform of the social protection system, reductions to 
the minimum wage, and legislation to address restrictions to trade 
in sectors such as the legal and medical professions. (Laffan, 2017) 
 
Although the first two elements were completed over the three years 
of the programme, in respect of structural reforms, the plans for 
minimum wage reduction were abandoned and little reform occurred 
in respect of the sheltered professions. Despite the external pressure 
of the troika, our interviews reveal that politicians and the Irish civil 
service had significant control over the structural reform agenda. As 
described by Hick (2018), the civil service steered the troika towards 
the stalled activation reform agenda and gained strong support among 
the international creditors. The troika supported the overall idea of 
the OSS and were more concerned about the implementation progress 
than the policy design, which gave Irish officials considerable leeway 
to find creative policy solutions, albeit under high time pressure. 
Constant international monitoring and accountability towards the 
troika was one of the key drivers behind the successful achievements 
in respect of the labour market activation and social protection reform 
measures, albeit they still took longer than envisaged. Although the 
full national implementation across the country showed some delays, 
the initial reform pace and quick implementation for the majority of 
jobseekers in 2012 and 2013 were seen as a huge success by the troika. 
These placed much emphasis on structural reforms to the benefit and 
activation regimes along the lines spelt out by an OECD review in 
2009 (Grubb et al., 2009). Murphy (2016, p. 7) suggests that the 
presence of the subsequent troika programme was an important factor 
in the government being able ‘to drive through the veto culture which 
might otherwise have sunk this long anticipated reform agenda’. 
In order to implement the troika plan, the government published its 
National Recovery Plan 2011–14 immediately after the loan 
programme was signed, which noted that ‘welfare and labour market 
policies must reward work and provide a pathway to employment, 
education and training opportunities for those who have lost their 
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jobs. Reforms in this area, along with measures to enhance 
competitiveness, are pivotal to growth in our economy’ (Government 
of Ireland, 2010, p. 10). As recalled by a former senior official in the 
DSP: 
 
[The troika] used to engage in very considerable depth because 
they wanted us to move to a much more proactive model of 
welfare delivery, particularly in the context of unemployment, 
and move to one where activation was the key rather than 
necessarily income support. So that was a fundamental shift, that 
was a real cultural shift for staff and people, a real difference 
created in terms of how we interacted with people and the kind 
of real emphasis on the responsibilities of those who were getting 
assistance from us, but they also had responsibilities in terms of 
showing a willingness to engage or take up training or look for 
jobs or whatever that wouldn’t have been present to the same 
extent before that time.  
 
So now, a huge interest, an awful lot of attention paid to it, an 
awful lot of attention paid to the overarching policy and querying 
component elements of that and why we’re doing things in 
particular ways or why we couldn’t do things differently. So quite 
intense engagement… this was very detailed reporting [to the 
troika] and also to cabinet committees on… a monthly basis, 
having to show very detailed reports about what was actually 
happening on the ground. So a huge amount of oversight while 
all of this was going on. (Interview of 9 September 2015) 
 
The three elements of the MOU provided an important context for 
the actual delivery of the reform process necessary to bring Intreo into 
being. In the next section we look in some more detail at the steps 
taken before turning to the key success factors that led to the new 
policy and organisation being delivered. 
 
Implementation of the reform 
The creation of a new entity for all employment and income supports 
within the department was formally announced in March 2010, and a 
programme board comprised of stakeholder representatives from the 
main affected organisations (FÁS, Department of Education and 
DSP) created. Initially, the programme was entitled the National 
Employment and Entitlements Service (NEES). The eventual name 
150                                                            STEPHAN KÖPPE AND MUIRIS MACCARTHAIGH  
07 Köppe et al article.qxp_Admin 67-2  20/05/2019  14:50  Page 150
Intreo emerged later in 2012 as a combination of the words 
‘introduction’ and the Irish ‘treo’, which stands for direction. Köppe & 
O’Connell note that, at a meeting of the project board in 2010, an 
implementation period of three to five years was envisaged for the full 
integration of the project (2017, p. 11). 
Following the conclusion of the Croke Park negotiations in June 
2010, agreement was reached with unions on the sequencing of staff 
moves, and during the autumn and winter the process of staff 
transferring to the new organisation began. The first phase involved 
divesting the HSE of its CWS function and the transfer of the 
approximately 1,000 staff involved in this work from the CWS to the 
DSP. At the same time legislation was passed in parliament allowing 
for the transfer of policy competence and responsibility from FÁS and 
CWS to the department. 
In March 2011 a new coalition government took office, and in their 
programme for government the Fine Gael/Labour Party coalition 
stated that: 
 
all employment and benefit support services will be integrated in 
a single delivery unit managed by the Department of Social 
Protection. This integrated service would provide a ‘one stop 
shop’ for people seeking to establish their benefit entitlements; 
looking for a job; and seeking advice about their training 
options. (Department of the Taoiseach, 2011, p. 7)  
 
This represented an important change to the organisational form of 
the service, and the use of an OSS model (which had not previously 
existed in Ireland, save at local authority level for public services) 
required additional measures.  
By the end of 2011 the CWS staff had fully integrated into NEES 
and in 2012 were joined by about 700 staff from FÁS who had worked 
on community employment and employment services within that 
organisation. By this stage, however, three years had passed since the 
onset of the crisis. FÁS itself had been abolished and replaced by a 
new entity, SOLAS (An tSeirbhís Oideachais Leanúnaigh agus 
Scileanna, the Further Education and Training Authority), which was 
given a remit to focus on further education and training programmes, 
including a national apprenticeship programme. Several hundred 
other staff were transferred from other departments from 2009 – and 
from 2010, facilitated by the Croke Park Agreement provisions on 
mobility – so that the department grew from 4,900 staff in 2008 to 
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almost 7,000 by 2012, one of very few to experience growth during this 
period. Reflecting on this, a former senior official noted: 
 
we brought in a lot of [people] who had been working in 
employment services or as community welfare officers but they 
also brought their work with them which is something that 
people forget… this wasn’t that we suddenly got a present of 
1,700 staff with no work. We got their work, we then had to look 
at how do we integrate, how do we streamline it, how do we 
integrate it, how do we offer it differently, how do we boost it up 
where it needs to be boosted, how do we train people.  
 
The budgetary allocation to the department also grew substantially 
during this time of retrenchment. As Figure 4 identifies, it was the only 
department that increased its budget in the period 2008–12, mainly 
driven by higher demand for benefit payments. The increased 
responsibilities and taking on of new staff from the HSE and FÁS also 
increased the administrative budget, but not to the same extent as 
increased claimant figures.  
Figure 4: Impact of spending cuts by policy area (%), 2008–12  
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A series of practical issues also arose in relation to the new staff, 
including differences in contractual arrangements given many, but not 
all, were employed on civil servant contracts. Many of the CWS staff 
were also dispersed across 900 locations across the state, and the FÁS 
staff were similarly decentralised across approximately 60 locations. 
As social workers, CWS staff had also operated with a necessary 
degree of discretion, which was not part of the culture in the 
department or FÁS. The programme board overseeing the creation of 
NEES/Intreo therefore invested heavily in communications across the 
merging and physically dispersed organisations to make sure all staff 
were aware of impending changes. These communications were also 
vital for ensuring consistency across the service such that all jobseekers 
would receive the same service regardless of location, and have equal 
access to training opportunities.  
In April 2012, just over a year after the government announced 
them, a number of pilot schemes which integrated benefit claims with 
activation measures were initiated. These were deemed to have been 
a success and in October Intreo was formally launched by the 
Taoiseach and the Minister for Social Protection. The minister at this 
time was from the social democratic Labour Party and had a long-
standing commitment to systematic welfare reform and provided 
strong support for the reform during her term of office until 2016. 
However, her focus was on the main reform strategy and less on the 
modalities of the implementation. Despite the ministerial support 
from 2011 onwards, it would be another year before the first tranche 
of Intreo OSSs were opened, and it took another two years for the 
nationwide scheme of OSSs to open (Köppe & O’Connell, 2017,  
p. 12). Her successor in 2016, from the Christian democratic Fine Gael 
Party, likewise supported the programme but without engaging in 
changes to the implementation plan.  
During this period, and as noted above, there was considerable 
pressure arising from government and troika demands for progress 
information on the implementation of the reform measures. Added to 
this, the department experienced several staff changes at senior level 
due to retirements in autumn 2010 though, as Köppe & O’Connell 
(2017, p. 15–16) note, this also allowed for new networks to be created 
and new ideas to emerge in the key implementation stage of 2011/12. 
Also, while the department was undertaking this reform in tandem 
with an escalation of demand for income supports for jobseekers, it 
was also charged with delivering several other reforms at the same 
time. These included changes in eligibility and the duration of benefits 
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across a number of income support schemes, including one-parent 
family payments, housing support payments and changes in the nature 
of exceptional needs payments.  
 
Key success factors 
Köppe & O’Connell (2017, p. 23–9) suggest that a number of factors 
were critical to the successful creation of the Intreo project (see also 
Figure 2): 
 
• a small and experienced team of four senior staff to design, 
negotiate and lead on the reform implementation;  
• strong cooperation between staff, staff representatives and local 
managers across the thirteen regions through which the DSP had 
divided its work across the state; 
• emphasis on a ‘One DSP’ brand to unite different work cultures; 
• monthly progress reports to a cabinet subcommittee and quarterly 
reports to the troika during 2011–13, which provided political 
visibility at a top level for the Intreo work, as well as a chain of 
accountability; 
• trade union acquiescence (in the context of the Croke Park 
Agreement) to staff mobility and also to Labour Court 
determinations in respect of changes to terms and conditions of 
employment following staff transfers; 
• a new regional management structure, with thirteen divisions each 
managing the integration of CWS, DSP and former FÁS services;  
• in the absence of the necessary skills, engagement of an external 
consultancy firm to assist with development of a blueprint for the 
new service; 
• piloting of the new integrated service; 
• engagement of local staff in the implementation and adaptation of 
the new service to local needs. 
 
Considering the three key challenges of budget constraints, union 
resistance and complex organisational fragmentation described above, 
these actions and decisions were critical to a successful change and 
deserve elaboration. The limited use of external consulting in the 
context of small budgets meant greater use of rapid evidence reviews 
and small design workshops.  
While pioneering countries often started with lengthy pilots and 
original research to test the effectiveness of various activation 
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measures, the implementation group followed a very efficient 
international policy transfer and local adaptation process. Considering 
there was already a wealth of international evidence concerning which 
activation policies worked and the mounting problem pressure, this 
was a very effective strategy to achieve a rapid change, while ensuring 
good outcomes. A further advantage of this strategy was that all 
reform proposals had been tested and validated in other countries, so 
that the team could learn from these successes and failures. Explicitly, 
team members referred to the implementation failures of the OSS 
model in France and their strategic planning sought to avoid these. 
And the small management team could make decisions about which 
reform option to follow much faster than could a large one.  
While focusing on the internal communication and organisation, 
the core team also had to engage with the wider political–
administrative system. Indeed, the overall programme governance 
required support from the most senior levels across the department, 
and engagement with the political executive and troika (as the reform 
formed part of the conditionality to which Ireland had agreed). There 
were also many people involved in the actual organisational 
amalgamation. Thus, the idea of how to proceed with the reform 
measures was supported by a strong evidence base, and by all major 
political and administrative actors. 
Second, overall the crisis created a window of opportunity to 
overcome an important interest group that had traditionally held veto 
power over such change. At a time of high unemployment, public 
sector trade unions have little bargaining power, and the Croke Park 
Agreement limited the opportunity for union resistance. While the 
overarching negotiation strategy was collaborative, at key stages the 
reform team used the new binding arbitration mechanism to bring 
contested reform proposals to the Labour Court. Instead of further 
lengthy negotiations it sped up the decision process and the DSP also 
won in most of the cases (Köppe & O’Connell, 2017, p. 30). 
In relation to partisan interests, the absence of any great ideological 
division within the Irish political system over the creation of Intreo was 
important. In large part, this was due to the social democratic Labour 
Party being in office and holding responsibility for public expenditure 
and public service reform. Their centre-right Fine Gael coalition 
partners had committed to the reform measures in the programme for 
government, and the troika demands also served to remove the 
creation of Intreo as a subject of contestation. Equally, there is little 
evidence of lobbying by interest groups or jobseekers themselves to 
inhibit the reform programme.  
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Third, the implementation team institutionalised an effective 
communication strategy at their core to coordinate across all involved 
institutional actors. Although the strategy was devised and driven at 
the top level, the core team was essential in elaborating and executing 
it successfully throughout the organisation. The core team defined 
themselves as an information hub that brought the departmental 
expertise together at the top level. At the same time they introduced 
what were then innovative human resource communication strategies 
into the DSP. Staff members were listened to in town hall meetings 
and regularly informed through reform newsletters, and senior 
management shared information videos via the intranet. Overall, this 
created cross-departmental information sharing and the 
implementation team was at the centre to coordinate the task 
effectively. 
 
Inhibitors in the implementation chain 
Despite the overall implementation success in terms of delivering a 
national OSS network for jobseekers, we have to acknowledge a 
number of implementation inhibitors. These shortcomings did not 
hinder the delivery of the service, but rather contributed to 
considerable delays in some parts of the country. Therefore, failures 
would exaggerate the actual impact of these delays and inhibitors are 
more appropriate to describe the weak links in the implementation 
chain. In addition, they might have reduced the anticipated 
improvements in service quality and labour market outcomes for 
jobseekers.  
In the first place, the national rollout was substantially delayed. 
Although the first Intreo office was launched in autumn 2012, and 
about a year later forty-four offices were open, it took another three 
years to open the remaining sixteen planned offices. These delays were 
mainly due to extensive refurbishing work that had to be done at these 
sites.  
Secondly, the DSP started to deliver an integrated service for the 
user, but lacked efficient IT infrastructure to deliver a modern 
administrative OSS. The client databases were not merged and the 
DSP relied on the FÁS infrastructure. The actual work to integrate the 
benefit claimant software with the activation case management 
commenced only in 2014 and was completed in 2016. In other words, 
until that time Intreo office workers had to rely on different IT 
systems, while they were supposed to deliver an integrated service.  
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Thirdly, other work has also highlighted the poor match of the 
activation measures offered to jobseekers (O’Connell, 2017). Some of 
the training and education services delivered proved to have weak 
links to labour market demands and had little effect on labour market 
reintegration. The OSS improved massively the speed of benefit 
claims to benefit payment (from three weeks to three days) as well as 
the needs assessment (e.g. PEX scores), but matching jobseekers with 
optimal training retains potential for major improvements. 
 
Conclusion 
What began as an organisational merger and the integration of 
employment services and benefits payments turned into a more 
substantial and overdue reform of national labour activation 
measures. However, far from being a rational, evidence-based policy 
affair imitating the practice in another European state, it was an 
iterative and incremental process (Köppe & O’Connell, 2017) that, in 
keeping with Kingdon (2011), saw long-standing ideas interact with 
existing (party and trade union) and new (troika) interests, as well as 
institutions, in the process of organisational reform. These reforms 
brought Ireland closer to the European norm (Murphy, 2016) within a 
very short period. The rapid catch-up process was enormous, 
considering the combined problem pressure of high unemployment 
and sovereign debt crisis.  
The coordination of the reform implementation by a small 
management team over a number of years was heavily influenced by 
wider contextual factors, including the acquiescence of trade unions 
and strong consistent political commitment to the reform programme. 
As well as proximate factors that facilitated reforms, we also identified 
a number of inhibitors in the implementation programme, including 
delays with facilities and IT integration. The resulting model brings its 
own challenges, and O’Connell (2017, p. 250) suggests that Intreo 
continues to ‘lack a systematic and rigorous system of monitoring of 
job search’, and questions the efficacy of the training and educational 
offerings by the organisation in achieving suitable employment for 
those engaged in them. Nonetheless, that such a major organisational 
and service reform programme was implemented during the period of 
the Irish state’s most serious economic crisis, and when demand for 
services increased rapidly, was a remarkable achievement.  
The Irish labour market is still facing some key challenges which 
several of our European neighbours seem to address better. With 
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almost full employment, a revived Celtic tiger complacency appears to 
have slowed down the reform process. For instance, the Irish labour 
market structure remains highly segregated, with the highest pre-tax 
income inequality in Europe. Highly qualified and paid employees 
exist in the large tech, pharma and finance sectors, but a low paid ‘gig’ 
economy also exists. Ireland has one of the weakest labour market 
regulations in Europe (OECD, 2013, Chapter 2), which typically 
harms lowly paid workers. For instance, zero-hour contracts are not 
heard of in most European states. Other policy areas are not 
integrated within the activation agenda, such as affordable childcare 
and a transparent and gradual means-tested benefit system that 
encourages work. For instance, female labour force participation 
remains low and full employment only means male workers are in high 
demand. The activation agenda progressed considerably during this 
2010–16 period, but has not yet led to embracing a social investment 
state (Köppe, 2018), and further reforms are required to see the 
positive benefits of activation, and not just increased sanctions.  
This paper could not show the extent to which the reduction in 
unemployment figures from 2013 can be directly attributed to the 
activation reforms. The Irish Government made several other radical 
reforms during the crisis period in respect of taxation and reductions 
in pay and personnel across the entire public service that all 
contributed to relatively quick economic recovery in comparison to 
Greece or Portugal. Still, compared to previous recessions, the drop in 
unemployment figures was remarkably quick and sustained once the 
economy recovered, which is an indication that the concerted policy 
reforms made a difference, but it is not clear to which reform elements 
this can be attributed. More Irish and comparative research is 
required to assess the outcomes of these reforms in context. For 
instance, the fifth IMF progress report for Greece (IMF, 2014) noted 
significant delays in implementing activation reforms. In other words, 
the rapid implementation was a success, but it still has to be seen if the 
reforms are also linked to outcomes in the labour market.  
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